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Abstract 
 
This study attempts to analyze determinants of corruption tendency on a single country, 
namely Malaysia, using cross-sectional data. Using survey questions on sample of 
respondents in two states of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, data are collected 
and logit model is developed for estimation. The results from the regression on sample 
indicate that age negatively contributes to corruption tendency among government 
servants. The results also show that there are two departments, namely Police and 
Immigration departments, which have high probability of corruption and large spending, 
in particular, payments of personal debt, is positively contribute to high tendency of 
corruption among government servants.  
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Introduction 
 
The World Bank has once identified that corruption is as the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development. This is because it distorts the rule of law and 
weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. Even the 
issue of corruption has now become the main agenda at international conference, 
business gatherings and academic conferences. It also becomes a key election issue in 
many countries. This new climate of combating corruption and put good governance, 
which nearly unmentionable before mid 1990s, is due to the awareness of serious impact 
of corruption in many countries, in particular, developing or ‘in transition’. 
 
The impact of corruption is not only felt at political and administration level, it also 
penetrates negatively on economy and society. Politically, it threatens democracy, 
political system and the country image. Economically, it contributes to unjust distribution 
of income, discourages investment and distorts economic growth and development 
especially in the long-run. Socially, social stability is affected, the tax-payers will be 
burdened, it put negative perspective on society and it leads to the waste of expertise and 
knowledge. At national level, serious corruption will undermine both free and fair trade, 
which should be based on price, quality and service and hinder national, international and 
multi-national companies from operating legally and ethically. 
 
Having said this, several studies have been conducted on the impact of corruption among 
government servant/bureaucrats. Among all are Bliss and Di Tella (1997), Myrdal 
(1968), Mauro (1995), Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Burget and Che (2004). Bliss and Di 
Tella (1997) found that bureaucrats may create artificial barriers to entry to generate 
monopoly rents from which bribes are extracted, at a cost to consumers of less product 
variety. Bureaucrats may also over-regulate to increase the opportunities to collect bribes, 
thereby reducing the incentive to invest and diminishing overall economic performance 
(Myrdal, 1968; Mauro, 1995). Study by Ehrlich and Lui (1999) found that competition to 
become a bureaucrat with the power to collect economic rents from corrupt activity can 
cause individuals to over-invest in political capital relative to human or physical capital. 
Furthermore, Burguet and Che (2004) conclude that the cost of public projects may be 
higher when corrupt agents are in charge of procurement. 
 
Beside the fact that the above studies have shown that public corruption could harm the 
economy through different channels, few studies have been done in analyzing the 
determinants of corruption among public/government servants. Several studies looking 
on the relationship between civil-service pay and corruption however show that the 
theory on this relationship is still ambiguous. In regard of other determinants, Ades and 
Di Tella (1997, 1999) have shown that the degree of competition and industrial policy 
have a significant effect on corruption. The absence of competition and active industrial 
policies creates rents, by way of more profitable or favored domestic firms, which 
bureaucrats and politicians then extract. Kaufmann (1997) has found a very strong 
correlation between bribery to public officials and “regulatory discreation”, such as 
exchange controls. Corruption is also attributed to purely cultural factors or lack of 
leadership (Tanzi, 1994; Lee, 1986). Alternatively, the level of education of civil servants 
can be a factor which reduces corruption (Hauk nad Saez-Marti, 2002; Miller, 2005) and 
finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that more ethnically diverse countries are 
prone to a disorganized form of corruption. 
 
However, most empirical studies of corruption among public servants was done across 
countries including studies on the impact of public corruption on economic growth 
(Mauro, 1997; Mo, 2001), on foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000) and productivity 
(Lambsdorff, 2003) including the above studies on determinants of corruption. In this 
study, determinants of public corruption will be analyzed within a single country, namely 
Malaysia, to avoid many potential problems that international comparison may encounter. 
Corruption, its definition and factors contribute to it, varies greatly across countries and 
periods of time within a given country. Thus, by using cross-sectional data on a specific 
country, this study will attempt to mitigate these problems.  
 
Furthermore, this study will use ‘tendency’ of corruption rather than using the 
‘numerical’ measure of corruption, which the proxies used by many studies are always 
debated. For instance, using international data, such as Transparency index, makes it 
difficult to consistently and accurately measure corruption across different countries and 
cultures (Mauro, 1995). The use of tendency of corruption measure is also enable 
empirical study, using economic modeling, to be done from survey questions at specific 
time for a specific country without worrying about availability of time series data.  
 
This study is thus organized as follows. Following the introduction in Section 1, Section 
2 reviews data and empirical work. Section 3 presents the findings and Section 4 
concludes. 
 
Data and empirical work 
 
Sample 
 
The sample in this study consisted of 596 randomly selected government servants from 4 
major government departments in capital city of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur (representing 
urban area) and nearby state of Selangor (representing suburb area). All respondents were 
chosen randomly at all level of incomes and rankings regardless of age, gender, marital 
status, ethnic group and level of education. Table 1 presents details on this sample. 
Generally, the sample made up of 20.8% from Department of Immigration, 25.7% from 
Department of Transportation, 8.9% from Malaysian Royal Custom and 44.6% from 
Malaysian Royal Police. 
 
Based on the sample, it is found that majority of the respondents are from Malay ethnicity 
and being Malays, they are expected to be Muslim too. Most of them is at the age of less 
than 50 years old (96.5%) and most of them has level of education only at secondary 
level and below (91.6%). 
 
Table 1: Sample description of respondents 
 
 Number of respondents 
 Kuala Lumpur Selangor 
 
Total 
 
Total 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
596 (100.0) 
 
Department
   
Immigration 59 (47.6) 65 (52.4) 124 (20.8) 
Transportation 90 (58.8) 63 (41.2) 153 (25.7) 
Custom 36 (67.9) 17 (32.1) 53 (8.9) 
Police 113 (42.5) 153 (57.5) 266 (44.6) 
    
Gender    
Male 164 (51.1) 157 (48.9) 321 (53.9) 
Female 134 (48.7) 141 (51.3) 275 (46.1) 
    
Ethnic group    
Malay 275 (92.3) 275 (92.3) 550 (92.3) 
Chinese 5 (1.7) 8 (2.7) 13 (2.2) 
Indian 9 (3.0) 5 (1.7) 14 (2.3) 
Others 9 (3.0) 10 (3.3) 19 (3.2) 
    
Religion    
Muslim 279 (93.6) 282 (94.6) 561 (94.1) 
Christian 9 (3.0) 5 (1.7) 14 (2.3) 
Buddhist 5 (1.7) 5 (1.7) 10 (1.7) 
Hindu 5 (1.7) 5 (1.7) 10 (1.7) 
Others 0 (0.0) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.2) 
    
Age    
Less than 25 51 (17.1) 50 (16.8) 101 (16.9) 
26 to 33 91 (30.5) 70 (23.5) 161 (27.0) 
34 to 41 60 (20.1) 44 (14.8) 104 (17.4) 
42 to 49 62 (20.8) 88 (29.5) 150 (25.2) 
Above 50 32 (10.7) 43 (14.4) 75 (12.6) 
No information 2 (0.7) 3 (1.0) 5 (0.8) 
    
Education    
Secondary and below 267 (89.5) 279 (93.6) 546 (91.6) 
First degree 24 (8.1) 15 (5.0) 39 (6.5) 
Second degree and 
above 
6 (2.0) 4 (1.3) 10 (1.7) 
No information 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1(0.2) 
    
Notes: Percentages are shown in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
These personal and other information are collected from the respondents using written 
questionnaires which distributed through field study in year 2006. Other information 
collected include size of income (per individual as well as per household), size of 
expenditure and types of debt. All these information are later being used as independent 
variables/factors which incorporated in modeling the tendency of corruption which will 
be explained detailed in next section. Summarized data on size of income and size of 
expenditure of the respondents are shown on Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Income and Expenditure of respondents 
 
 Number of respondents 
 Kuala Lumpur Selangor 
 
Total 
 
Total 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
596 (100.0) 
    
Individual income (per 
month)
   
< RM1,500 120 (40.3) 126 (42.3) 246 (41.3) 
RM1,500 to RM2,499 141 (47.3) 128 (43.0) 269 (45.1) 
RM2,500 to RM3,499 17 (5.7) 29 (9.7) 46 (7.7) 
RM3,500 to RM4,500 10 (3.4) 8 (2.7) 18 (3.0) 
>RM4,500 8 (2.7) 5 (1.7) 13 (2.2) 
No information 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (0.7) 
    
Household income (per 
month)
   
< RM1,500 66 (22.1) 60 (20.1) 126 (21.1) 
RM1,500 to RM2,499 82 (27.5) 64 (21.5) 146 (24.5) 
RM2,500 to RM3,499 49 (16.4) 71 (23.8) 120 (20.1) 
RM3,500 to RM4,500 45 (15.1) 53 (17.8) 98 (16.4) 
>RM4,500 54 (18.1) 48 (16.1) 102 (17.1) 
No information 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 4 (0.7) 
    
Total expenditure (per 
month)
   
< RM1,500 117 (39.3) 101 (33.9) 218 (36.6) 
RM1,500 to RM2,499 93 (31.2) 94 (31.5) 187 (31.4) 
RM2,500 to RM3,499 36 (12.1) 59 (19.8) 95 (15.9) 
RM3,500 to RM4,500 27 (9.1) 23 (7.7) 50 (8.4) 
>RM4,500 18 (6.0) 17 (5.7) 35 (5.9) 
No information 7 (2.3) 4 (1.3) 11 (1.8) 
    
    
Average (per month)    
Individual income RM1,752 RM1,745  
Household income RM3,063 RM3,030  
Total expenditure RM2,079 RM2,129  
    
Notes: Percentages are shown in parentheses 
 
By looking at individual income per month, more than 80% of respondents earn less than 
RM2,500.00 per month. Almost similar percentage applies to each area of Kuala Lumpur 
(87.6%) and Selangor (85.3%). Being in big city with high cost of living, it is highly 
expected that income of individual person alone is insufficient to afford the whole family 
especially those who are married with children. Thus, information of household income, 
which includes income of spouse and family members are also worth to be collected in 
order to incorporate in our analysis as the amount of household income is more 
reasonable and reliable. Table 2 shows that when household income is considered, more 
than 80% of respondents earn less than RM4,500.00 per month. On average, household 
income is almost double of individual income in each area. As for expenditure, the survey 
questions which ask on spending of respondents are designed quite detail on types of 
spending made by respondents per month. Those include how much they spend on foods, 
transportation, rents, education as well as payments of debt/mortgage/loans such as home 
mortgage, car loans, personal loans etc. However, we also perceive that size of debt alone 
could be an important attribute to tendency of corruption among government servants. In 
order to capture this important factor in our analysis, the amount of debt (size and 
percentage from income) are recomputed separately from total expenditure. Information 
on size of debt of respondent is displayed on Table 3.   
 
It is found that almost 70% of respondents spend RM1,500.00 and below to pay for their 
debts per month in each area of Kuala Lumpur (71.4%) and Selangor (68.0%) regardless 
of their income levels. To be more specific in getting information about the burden of 
debt, re-computation of the amount of debt as a percentage of individual and household 
incomes is made. When individual income is considered, it is found that almost 70% of 
respondents, in each area, spend 0% to 79% of their income on debt. Obviously, this 
reflects high burden of debt among government servants especially when it is also found 
that there are some respondents spend more than 100% of their income on debt (3.7% in 
KL and 5.4% in Selangor). On the other hand, when household income is taken into 
consideration, the findings on the burden of debt are seemed reasonable. Almost 80% of 
respondents, in each area, spend 0% to 59% of their income paying debts (81.9% in KL 
and 76.4% in Selangor) and no respondents spend more than 100% of their income on 
debts. However, these findings should be taken with precaution as there are some 
respondents are unwilling to declare any information on their debts.  
 
In regard of types of debt the respondents are dealing with, as expected, they are mostly 
burdened with debts on necessities such as home and vehicle. However, surprisingly, 
almost 40% of respondents are also burdened by personal debt. This is probably caused 
by recent trend in Malaysia where personal loan is highly promoted by some financial 
institutions to government servants who have stable and secured income as compared to 
employees in private sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 3: Size and types of debt of respondents 
 Number of respondents 
 Kuala Lumpur Selangor 
 
Total  
 
Total respondents 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
298 (100.0) 
 
596 (100.0) 
 
Total  respondents who has 
debt 
 
 
249 (83.6) 
 
 
232 (77.9) 
 
 
481 (80.7) 
 
Estimated amount of debt 
(per month)
 
 
 
  
< RM500 102 (34.2) 80 (26.8) 182 (30.5) 
RM500 to RM999 77 (25.8) 77 (25.8) 154 (25.8) 
RM1,000 to RM1,499 34 (11.4) 46 (15.4) 80 (13.4) 
RM1,500 to RM1,999 17 (5.7) 16 (5.4) 33 (5.5) 
>RM2,000 19 (6.4) 13 (4.4) 32 (5.4) 
No information 49 (16.4) 66 (22.1) 115 (19.3) 
    
% of debt from individual 
income
   
< 20% 54 (18.1) 38 (12.8) 92 (15.4) 
20% to 39% 89 (29.9) 85 (28.5) 174 (29.2) 
40% to 59% 55 (18.5) 55 (18.5) 110 (18.5) 
60% to 79% 20 (6.7) 22 (7.4) 42 (7.0) 
80% to 100% 20 (6.7) 16 (5.4) 36 (6.0) 
> 100% 11 (3.7) 16 (5.4) 27 (4.5) 
No information 49 (16.4) 66 (22.1) 115 (19.3) 
    
% of debt from household 
income
   
< 20% 105 (35.2) 91 (30.5) 196 (32.9) 
20% to 39% 112 (37.6) 108 (36.2) 220 (36.9) 
40% to 59% 27 (9.1) 29 (9.7) 56 (9.4) 
60% to 79% 4 (1.3) 4 (1.3) 8 (1.3) 
80% to 100% 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 
> 100% 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
No information 49 (16.4) 66 (22.1) 115 (19.3) 
    
Average debt (per month) RM764 RM807  
 
% of debt from individual 
income (on average) 
 
 
42.2% 
 
 
47.1% 
 
 
% of debt from household 
income (on average) 
 
 
24.4% 
 
 
25.7% 
 
 
Types of debt
 
% of respondents having the debt 
 
Home 49.7 50.0  
Vehicle (car, motorcycle etc.) 64.1 61.4  
Business 1.7 3.7  
Personal 39.9 45.0  
Credit card 16.1 20.1  
Others 8.7 12.1  
Notes: Percentages are shown in parentheses 
 
Tendency of corruption 
 
Data on ‘tendency of corruption’ among government servant are also collected using 
survey questions which are constructed using example of corruption cases (5 cases) and 
the respondents have to answer, using scale,  whether the acts in those cases are 
considered as acceptable or not acceptable, serious or not serious offence from his/her 
own view and the department’s view. Five scales of answers are provided and those 
answers which are below scale of 3 are considered most likely to allow corruption acts to 
happen or, in other words, has high tendency of corruption and the score of 3 and above 
are considered low/no tendency of corruption. 
 
Answers obtained for those cases are later re-coded into binary numbers (0 or 1) which 
are used as data of dependent variable in modeling determinants of tendency of 
corruption, where 0 represents no tendency of corruption and 1 represents high tendency 
of corruption. Value of 0 is computed if score of all 5 cases are 3 and above and value of 
1 is computed if at least 1 case scores below 3. 
 
 
Modeling determinants of corruption tendency 
 
In this study the model used is a nonlinear regression model specifically designed for 
binary dependent variables. Unlike linear probability model, this model adopts a 
nonlinear formulation that forces the predicted values to be between 0 and 1 by using 
cumulative probability distribution function (c.d.f.) which denoted by F. Apart from 
using logit regression, probit regression could also be used in modeling binary dependent 
variables. The difference between logit and probit regressions is that probit regression 
uses the standard normal c.d.f. and logit  regression uses the “logistic” c.d.f.1. The 
logistic cumulative distribution function has a specific functional form, defined in terms 
of the exponentional function. The population logit model of the binary dependent 
variable Y with multiple regressors could be expressed as: 
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The main motivation for logit regression was that the logistic c.d.f. could be computed 
faster than the normal c.d.f. (Stock and Watson, 2007) 
 
In modeling determinants of corruption tendency, we develop a Logit Model as follows: 
 
 
1 Refer to Stock and Watson (2007) for detail explanation. 
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where Li is a dummy variable with value of 0 or 1.  Li = 0, if there is no tendency of 
corruption and Li = 1 if there is tendency of corruption. As explained in earlier section, 
value of Li is obtained by re-coded the scale answers of respondents on the developed 
corruption cases in the survey questions. SIZEDEBT is size of debt (as percentage of 
household income), DPNDT is number of dependents, SPEND is the amount of spending 
(in Ringgit Malaysia), AGE is age of respondent in years, GENDER is a dummy variable 
of gender (1=male, 0=female), INCOME is the level of household income (in Ringgit 
Malaysia), RACE is a dummy variable of race (0=non-Malay, 1=otherwise), TDEBT is 
dummy variables of types of debt (5 dummies for 6 types of debt), EDU is a dummy 
variable of education level (0= secondary and below, 1=otherwise) and RLGN is a 
dummy variable of religion (0=non-Muslim, 1=Muslim) and DEPT is dummy variables 
of government departments (3 dummies for 4 departments)  
 
In general, if we take the antilog of the jth slope coefficients (β’s), subtract one from it, 
and multiply the result by 100, we will get the percent change in the odds for a unit 
increase in the jth regressor. The percentage change could be interpreted as probability 
the corruption will change (increase or decrease) due to a unit increase in independent 
variable such as size of debt, spending, age and others. 
 
It is also important to note that the R2 is a poor measure of fit for the linear and nonlinear 
probability model (Stock and Watson, 2007). Therefore, we use another measure of fit for 
this model of binary dependent variable, namely “fraction correctly predicted’. The 
fraction correctly predicted uses the following rule: If Yi=1 and the predicted probability 
exceeds 50%, or if Yi=0 and the predicted probability less than 50%, then Yi is said to be 
correctly predicted. Otherwise, Yi is said to be incorrectly predicted. The “fraction 
correctly predicted” is the fraction of the n observations Y1, …….. Yn that are correctly 
predicted. Using EVIEWS, the fraction is stated in term of percentage which displayed as 
“% correct” in our results. It indicates how many % the estimated model correctly 
predicts the observations. Besides, we will also perform Pearson χ2-type tests of 
goodness-of-fit, namely Hosmer-Lemeshow (1989) and Andrews (1988a, 1988b). The 
idea underlying these tests is to compare the fitted expected values to the actual values by 
group. If these differences are ‘large’ the model is rejected as providing an insufficient fit 
to the data. 
 
 
Findings 
 
The regression of the logit model is done both using split sample and the whole sample. 
The former method is used by splitting the whole sample by area (Kuala Lumpur and 
Selangor) and the regression is done separately in order to look at factors lead to 
tendency of corruption in each area. The latter method is used with total sample of 
respondents regardless of the area. 
 
Column 2 of Table 4 displays result of logit  regression for area of Kula Lumpur . It is 
found that age and department, where the respondents are working, are significant factors 
contribute to tendency of corruption among government servants, other things remain 
constant. Negative sign of age coefficient indicates that there is high tendency of 
corruption among young respondents as compared to aged respondents. Positive signs for 
coefficients of departments of Immigration and Royal Police, reflect that there are high 
tendency of corruption among government servants who are working in these 
departments as compared to other departments in study. Both coeffcients of age and 
Immigration department are significant at 5% level while coefficient of Police 
department is significant at 1% level. By converting the coefficients of each variable to 
percentage change in the odds, as mentioned in earlier section, it is found that a year 
younger of the respondents contributes to 5.85% increase in tendency/probability of 
corruption, vice versa.  
 
Further analysis is done on data of Selangor and column 3 of Table 4 displays the results 
of logit regression on these data. Similar to Kuala Lumpur, age is also important factor 
contributes to tendency of corruption as it is significant at 1% level. Besides, department 
of Immigration and personal debt are also other important factors in the regression which 
significant at 5% level and 1% level, respectively. Similar to results obtained for Kuala 
Lumpur, coefficient of age is negative which again indicates that young respondents have 
high tendency of corruption as compared to older respondents. The re-computation of 
coefficient into percentage change shows that a year younger of respondents contributes 
to 6.74% increase in tendency of corruption. As for department of Immigration, the 
positive sign reflects that those who are working in this department, as compared to other 
departments in study, have high tendency to involve in corruption. Interestingly, type of 
debt, that is, personal debt also has positive sign which indicates that the burden of debt 
especially personal debt of respondents also contributes to high tendency of corruption. 
 
For the whole sample, results of logit regression which depicted in column 4 of Table 4 
identify four significant attributes to tendency of corruption in these 2 states/areas. As 
expected, age contributes negatively to tendency of corruption which tells that young 
government servants have high tendency to involve in corruption as compared to the aged 
one. The percentage change of odd for this variable is about 5.71%. It is also found that 
both Police and Immigration departments are positively contributes to high tendency of 
corruption as compared to other departments in study with percentage changes of odd of 
479.66% and 410.30%, respectively. In this regression too, a new attribute to tendency of 
corruption which able to be identified is ‘spending’ which also positively correlated with  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Logit Regression 
Dependent Variable: Tendency of Corruption              Equation 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Kuala Lumpur 
(2) 
Selangor 
(3) 
Whole sample 
(Kuala Lumpur 
and Selangor) 
 
constant 
 
 
0.6128 
(0.499) 
 
0.3352 
(0.158) 
 
0.5100 
(0.516) 
dependent 
 
0.0632 
(0.634) 
-0.0419 
(-0.381) 
0.0338 
(0.489) 
gender 
 
-0.2486 
(-0.7043) 
0.4897 
(1.161) 
0.0051 
(0.020) 
education 
 
-0.0704 
(-0.180) 
-0.6849 
(-1.282) 
-0.1500 
(-0.513) 
age 
 
-0.0602** 
(-2.553) 
-0.0698*** 
(-2.588) 
-0.0588*** 
(-3.536) 
Religion 0.2642 
(0.196) 
 
1.9953 
(1.017) 
0.8207 
(0.789) 
Size of debt 0.0045 
(0.329) 
 
-0.0507 
(1.296) 
-0.0177 
(-1.284) 
Immigration 
department 
1.2277** 
(2.022) 
 
2.429** 
(2.000) 
1.6298*** 
(3.238) 
Transportation 
department 
0.8147 
(1.271) 
 
0.6429 
(0.515) 
0.6442 
(1.238) 
Royal Police 
Malaysia 
1.8092*** 
(2.921) 
 
2.0589 
(1.635) 
1.7573*** 
(3.506) 
Income -0.000068 
(-0.480) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.949) 
-0.0001 
(-1.113) 
Spending 0.000324 
(1.482) 
 
0.0003 
(1.252) 
0.0003** 
(2.086) 
Race -0.7959 
(-0.589) 
 
-0.6178 
(-0.364) 
-0.6196 
(-0.631) 
Debt_vehicles 0.0048 
(0.013) 
 
-0.1101 
(-0.255) 
-0.1738 
(-0.652) 
Debt_credit 
cards 
-0.3582 
(-0.799) 
 
-0.2264 
(-0.430) 
-0.3703 
(-1.137) 
Debt_personal -0.0589 
(-0.176) 
 
1.0487*** 
(2.651) 
0.3557 
(1.463) 
Debt_house/home -0.1882 
(-0.494) 
 
-0.1646 
(-0.389) 
-0.1669 
(-0.619) 
% Correct 65.35 71.89 67.70 
H-L statistic 7.1398 9.1374 7.0691 
Andrews statistic 9.3984 24.7592*** 8.3194 
Notes: 1. Z-statistic in parentheses 
            2. *** significant at 1% level 
                 ** significant at 5% leve 
                 *significant at 10% level. 
 
 
high tendency of corruption with 0.032% change in the odd/probability. This reflects that 
high spending habit of government servants could also lead to tendency of corruption. 
Though definition of ‘spending’ is quite general in this case, which might include 
payments of debt, by looking at regression result of Selangor and even the descriptive 
analysis on Table 3, it is obvious that payments of personal debt as a component of total 
spending is the main contributor to the tendency of corruption among government 
servants.  
 
Overall, the results obtained are mostly consistent with earlier findings. For example, 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) had also found that large spending is highly contribute to 
corruption and a study by Swamy , Knack, Lee and Azfar (2001), also found that young 
people and men, instead of women, have more tendency to commit corruption crime 
when demographic factors are taken into consideration as determinants of corruption. 
 
In addition, three models of logit regression depicted in Table 4 are also tested in terms of 
correct/incorrect classification (based on a user specified prediction rule) and goodness-
of-fit tests based on HL and Andrews statistics. As for logit regression of Kuala Lumpur, 
the estimated model correctly predicts 65.35% of the observations and the H-L and 
Andrews statistics indicates that there is small differences between the fitted expected 
values to the actual values by group and thus represent a good fit of model. The logit 
regression on Selangor reflects that about 71.89% of observations is correctly predicted 
by the estimated model. However, since the p-value of HL test is large while the value of 
Andrews test statistic is small, they provide mixed evidence of problems. As for the 
whole sample, 67.70% of observations is correctly predicted by the estimated model and 
both HL and Andrews tests indicate that the model fit the data very well. 
 
The findings from this study would have significant policy implication in mitigating the 
involvement of bureaucrats in corruption, in particular, in Malaysia. The results imply 
that proactive measures should be taken seriously to reduce the tendency of corruption 
especially among young government servants, for examples, by increase the awareness of 
clean acts/services and the worse impacts from the act of corruption through education 
and training. Since the majority of government servants are Muslim, the fact that Islam 
prohibits the act of corruption and bribery and treat ‘work’ as a trust from God which 
must be carried/done with full responsibility, more religious awareness should be given 
to them through systematic module of talks and seminars.  
 
Nevertheless, since departments of Police and Immigration are identified as 2 important 
departments, among others, which have high probability of corruption, disciplinary acts 
should be tightened in all government departments, particularly in these departments. 
Besides, protection on ‘whistle blower’ has to be elevated to encourage more servants to 
provide information willingly on any corruption act done within departments. As  
personal debt also contributes positively to the tendency of corruption, it is highly 
suggested that  size of debt of government servants should be monitored seriously. For 
instance, the cooperation between finance department and financial institutions, who are 
the loan providers, has to be established. The government servants should not be allowed 
to borrow money beyond his/her affordable income. This is to avoid a serious problem of 
debt which might lead to tendency of corruption. Having said this, a regular check on  
value of assets owned by bureaucrats, which currently have been practiced, should be 
strengthened and conducted more efficiently. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Due to the fact that only few studies have been done on determinants of corruption 
among government servants and most previous studies on corruption which was done 
across countries encounter potential problem of international comparison, this study 
attempts to analyze determinants of corruption tendency on a single country, namely 
Malaysia, using cross-sectional data. Using survey questions on sample of respondents of 
596 in 2 states, Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, data are collected to develop an economic 
model of determinants of corruption. Logit model is developed for split samples by area 
and whole sample to identify significant factors contribute to tendency of corruption. The 
results from the regression on those samples indicate that age negatively contributes to 
corruption tendency among government servants which suggest that young servants are 
more likely to involve in corruption. The results also show that there are two 
departments, namely Police and Immigration departments, which have high probability of 
corruption. In addition, it is also found that large spending, in particular, payments of 
personal debt, also positively contribute to high tendency of corruption among 
government servants. The results are mostly consistent with previous findings and most 
importantly they could assist the authority to take few steps on reducing the corruption 
problem by monitoring their spending habits, increasing the awareness of good 
governance among servants in each government department, in particular, Police and 
Immigration departments as well as among young and new government servants.  
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